Risk Analysis of the Future Implementation of a Safety Management System for Multiple RPAS Based on First Demonstration Flights

Francesco Grimaccia,Manuela Battipede,Paolo Maggiore,Federica Bonfante,Edoardo Filippone

doi:10.3390/electronics6030050

Abstract

The modern aeronautical scenario has welcomed the massive diffusion of new key elements, including the Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), initially used for military purposes only. The current decade has seen RPAS ready to become a new airspace user in a large variety of civilian applications. Although RPAS can currently only be flown into segregated airspaces, due to national and international Flight Aviation Authorities′ (FAAs) constraints, they represent a remarkable potential growth in terms of development and economic investments for aviation. Full RPAS development will only happen when flight into non-segregated airspaces is authorized, as for manned civil and military aircraft. The preliminary requirement for disclosing the airspace to RPAS is the implementation of an ad hoc Safety Management System (SMS), as prescribed by ICAO, for every aeronautical operator. This issue arises in the context of the ongoing restructuring of airspaces management, according to SESAR-JU in Europe and NextGen in the USA (SESAR-JU has defined how RPAS research should be conducted in SESAR 2020, all in accordance with the 2015 European ATM Master Plan). This paper provides the basis to implement a risk model and general procedures/methodologies to investigate RPAS safety, according to the operational scenarios defined by EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency). The study is based on results achieved by multiple-RPAS experimental flights, performed within the RAID (RPAS-ATM Integration Demonstration) project.

Highlights

IntroductionAccording to Circular number 328 issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [1], an Unmanned Aircraft System, or UAS, sometimes called “drone”, is an aircraft without a human being (pilot) on board
According to Circular number 328 issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [1], an Unmanned Aircraft System, or UAS, sometimes called “drone”, is an aircraft without a human being on board.A UAS can be fully autonomous or remotely piloted by a human being operating it from a ground station, using a Human–Machine Interface (HMI) to command and control the aircraft and a ground or satellite radio datalink to convey the control signals and download the flight data: this last category of UAS, defined as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) by the aforementioned ICAO Circular, is the main object of this paper, according to Article number 8 of the Chicago Convention
This paper provides the basis to implement a risk model and general procedures/methodologies to investigate RPAS safety, according to the operational scenarios defined by EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency)

Summary

Introduction

According to Circular number 328 issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [1], an Unmanned Aircraft System, or UAS, sometimes called “drone”, is an aircraft without a human being (pilot) on board. A UAS can be fully autonomous or remotely piloted by a human being operating it from a ground station, using a HMI to command and control the aircraft and a ground or satellite radio datalink (up/downlink) to convey the control signals and download the flight data: this last category of UAS, defined as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) by the aforementioned ICAO Circular, is the main object of this paper, according to Article number 8 of the Chicago Convention. Military groups have acknowledged the flexibility and effectiveness of the RPAS in accomplishing the following duties [2]:

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