Abstract

The puzzle why the Indian intervention in the UN during 1956–1957 on the “Question of Antarctica” fell short of a genuine post-colonial engagement, by choosing not to directly question the territorial claims, has remained largely unanswered. This research report argues that Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach to the “Question of Antarctica” during the first decade of India’s independence, coinciding with the east–west cold war, was a part of what he perceived as India’s “Tryst with Destiny”. One of the key drivers behind the rise and fall of the short but influential Indian intervention was the complex interplay between Nehru’s normative world view (in which Antarctica figured in conjunction with a host of other considerations such as disarmament) and a labyrinth of domestic and external geopolitical compulsions that unfolded during the tumultuous decade of 1950s and early 1960s.

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