Rigidity and direct reference

Abstract

What is it for a singular term, or for a use of a singular term, to be referential in strong sense, i.e. purely or directly referential? This is question I will try to answer in this paper. The intuitive (and largely metaphorical) notion of referentiality that is current in philosophical literature emerges from following set of statements: A referential term is a term that serves simply to refer. It is devoid of descriptive content, in sense at least that what it contributes to proposition expressed by sentence where it occurs is not a concept, but an object. Such a sentence is used to assert of object referred to that it falls under concept expressed by predicate expression in sentence. Proper names and demonstrative expressions are supposed to be referential in this sense; and although definite descriptions are not intrinsically referential, they have a referential use. That such a notion exists in contemporary philosophy is beyond question. But many philosophers do not like it. I suspect that there are two reasons why this is so. First, it is thought that intuitive notion of referentiality is too vague and metaphorical to be of any use; and second, assuming that a definite view does emerge from set of statements above, it is thought that there are serious objections to this view. I do not share this pessimism. I think that notion of referentiality can be satisfactorily defined, and that objections raised to referentiality theory can be met. In this paper, however, I will be mainly concerned with defining referentiality. Limitations of space will not allow me to present a thorough defense of doctrine of referentiality. My starting point will be related but less disreputable notion of rigidity, introduced by Saul Kripke in philosophical literature. It is perhaps a bit misleading to speak of the notion of rigidity, since I will show that there are, under that name, three different notions on market, all stemming from Kripke's characterization of a rigid designator as a designator that denotes same object in all possible worlds, The