Rightsizing the People's Liberation Army Navy: How Much Naval Force Will Beijing Deploy by 2016?

Abstract

T he current Chinese navy—the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)— has since its founding in 1949 labored as an adjunct of the army. It was not until the end of the Cold War and the removal of the Soviet threat that Beijing felt able to direct significantly increased defense resources to modernizing what has throughout its existence been a marginally effective coastal defense force. By 2006 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had already deployed a navy with the ships, submarines, aircraft and systems ready to serve in pursuit of specific national security objectives, with Taiwan at the head of that list. This process of modernization—which includes improved personnel education and training, further doctrinal development, and a coherent maritime strategic view from Beijing—will almost certainly continue throughout the next decade. By 2016 China will have available as an instrument of national power a navy capable of carrying out assigned missions. The PLAN of 2016, at three times its present size, will dominate East Asian navies—with the possible exception of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)—and will offer a very serious challenge to the U.S. Navy when it operates in that region’s waters. Present trends indicate that by 2016 the Chinese navy will allow Beijing to exert hegemonic leverage in maritime East Asia. This essay offers a brief review of PLAN development to 2016.