Abstract

In the EU's internal security policy-making, parliamentary power remains—de jure and de facto—patchy. This situation has been (unofficially) justified by reference to the idea that the liberal constraints on executive power typically introduced by parliaments mark an irresponsible challenge to the effectiveness of policy. This essay tests this apologia, examining three cases where the retention of liberal values would actually be conducive to effectiveness: the EU-US ‘Passenger Name Register Agreement’, the elaboration of common data protection standards and the ‘Returns Directive’ on the expulsion of illegal immigrants. It suggests that the posited ‘rights/effectiveness’ incompatibility in fact masks a search for autonomy by executive participants.

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