Abstract

Most rights claims are capable of being analysed in terms of both the competing theories of rights, the will theory and the interest theory. Discussion hitherto has concentrated on particular instances of rights claims which are easily accommodated by the one theory but accommodated only with difficulty (if at all) by the other. Such problematic examples have served to illuminate what is at stake between the rival theories. However, in the case of the right to a public trial, I argue that neither theory is capable of accommodating that particular ‘right’.

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