Right-to-Work Laws and Freedom of Collective Bargaining

Abstract

For the past 14 years the right-to-work controversy has been waged throughout the United States, principally at the state level. Despite pressure from many sources, President Eisenhower failed to advocate a national right-to-work law in his proposed labor program in January, 1958. Furthermore, Secretary of Labor Mitchell in his speech before the AFL-CIO Convention in 1957 said that the administration not recommend a so-called national right-to-work law and we will oppose such legislation, if it is proposed. (N. Y. Times, 12/6/57 p. 20). Undoubtedly, this dispute will remain a serious problem for many years to come in the states. It is most unlikely that Congress will enact a federal right-to-work law and it is rather improbable that Congress will eliminate Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides the authority for the states to enact broad right-to-work laws. Most of the analysis of right-to-work laws and their impact on the freedom of collective bargaining has been based on the pre? conceived labor philosophy of the individual analyst. As a result, the average analyst comes to a conclusion that such legislation is conducive or not conducive to free collective bargaining in a manner that could have been predicted after reading his first two paragraphs. As mentioned before, Section 14(b) of the National Labor Rela? tions Act provides the legal framework for the state right-to-work laws. This much-cited section simply says that nothing in the Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agree? ments requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial Law. This section became part of the law in 1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.