Right and Good: False Dichotomy?

Abstract

I intend to argue against this that there is a true dichotomy here, a genuine and important distinction whose character is reasonably well captured by the traditional deontological/teleological oppositionthough not by an opposition of 'right' to 'good'. I do not wish to deny that some conception of the good is involved in characterizing actions as right or wrong. Pybus seeks to show through an examination of each position in turn that neither can be complete or 'self sufficient', that they must be 'complementary in a genuine theory of morality' (p. 21). What exactly are these two positions? If I have understood her rightly, Pybus characterizes them in the following way: the deontologist rules out of moral theory the very notion which is central to the teleologist's account, and vice versa. The former tries to give an account of morality solely in terms of duty or obligation or what it is right or wrongto do; the latter tries to give an account solely in terms of ends, purposes or what is good and bad. Pybus' central argument is, in brief, that the deontologist must talk about ends and the teleologist about duties; these notions are conceptually interdependent. I shall begin with the second claim. Pybus writes of the teleologist: