Ricoeur's Ethics

Abstract

On surface, Paul Ricoeur's little ethic, presented in Soi-meme comme un autre,' has all makings of neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. In studies seven through nine, there is repertoire of classical references to the good phronesis, and arete. Moreover, some have observed that since Ricoeur seems to subordinate his exegesis of Kant to his exegesis of Aristotle, we should read this work primarily as contribution to neo-Aristotelian ethics.2 Even Ricoeur seems to intend much since he subordinates deontological viewpoint to teleological perspective.3 As he points out himself, the plurality of virtues according to Aristotelian and medieval tradition should not be dismissed merely for sake of respect of rule in Kantian perspective.4 However, upon closer reading, I will argue that Ricoeur's contribution to moral philosophy cannot be easily categorized contribution to modern-day neo-Aristotelian ethics of virtue. My primary contention will be that what counts, ultimately, in Ricoeur's ethicomoral program is not virtue but attestation. The two should not be confused; attestation is not virtue. I For sake of contrast, let me preface my discussion of Ricoeur in light of one contemporary neo-Aristotelian agenda where virtues do count. In Alasdair MacIntyre's well-known work, After Virtue,5 virtues do count and they have the central place.6 At very start, let me make most obvious distinction in that Ricoeur is consummate hermeneut while MacIntyre remains what I would call proto-hermeneut. Let me explain. MacIntyre proposes virtue-centered theory of ethics that is planted within much larger present-day critique of ethical foundationalism and formalism. His program rejects assumptions about moral reason timeless source of insight into truth about justice and good. The arguments in After virtue disparage concern for metaphysical assumptions that might underlie form of good, natural law, human nature, rational choice, well epistemological notions of certainty, self-evidence, and priori necessity. Rather, MacIntyre forges what some have called post-foundationalist conception of rationality where very sense of 'foundations' is superseded by kind of socially-located, historical reconstruction.7 Hence, to pursue moral philosophy properly, MacIntyre argues for necessity to see what is operating at various interlocking layers of social practice, social character, and historical circumstance. However, instead of elaborating consequences to his historicist position, MacIntyre reasserts necessity to establish morality on basis of classical concept of virtue. MacIntyre's attempts to make his version of virtue intelligible has evoked numerous criticisms that I will not repeat other than to emphasize fact that, in end, he never really tells us much about virtue.8 I will agree with criticism that he does not provide modern detailed conception of virtues, but merely argues for possibility of doing so.9 This is amazing given fact that close to one third of book is devoted to historical survey of virtues. What most critics have missed however is tautological nature of his historicist approach to virtue. In every stage of concept (practices, narrative unity of life, traditions), MacIntyre presupposes existence and operative presence of virtue. As he himself is well aware, very history of practices he describes will have to be simultaneously history of virtues and vices.' Is this saying any thing more than where there are practices of type MacIntyre speaks of, certain virtues will be present, such that presence of virtue will point to way certain practices are performed? For example, in first stage, we are told that a virtue is an acquired human quality possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices. …