Abstract
AbstractAt face value, Turkey–Rice is not the most complex or important WTO dispute ever litigated. The facts of the case give strong reason to believe that Turkey's restrictions on rice imports from the United States were not GATT-consistent. Turkey's steadfast refusal to provide exonerating evidence in its defence and the Panel's drawing of appropriate inference were probably the most remarkable issues of the case. Nevertheless, Turkey–Rice raises at least one interesting legal and economic question: How ‘activist’ are dispute panels today, and how interventionist should they be during the litigation process? We discuss the justification and role of activist panels and assess the consequences for parties' strategic behavior and incentive to provide accurate information.
Highlights
On 21 September 2007 the Panel issued its final report in Turkey – Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice.1 The action, brought by the United States, with Argentina, Australia, China, Egypt, the EU, Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand as Third Parties, challenged various aspects of Turkey’s import restrictions on rice
Since 2004 Turkey has officially structured its import regime of rice in the following manner : (a) for some periods between 2004 and 2006, Turkey had in place predetermined tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) with those ‘ in-quota ’ imports being offered at preferential tariff rates ; The authors would like to thank the American Law Institute and especially Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis for integrating them into this project
Turkey seems to have adopted a policy of denying Certificates of Control to over-quota rice imports at MFN rates
Summary
On 21 September 2007 the Panel issued its final report in Turkey – Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice. The action, brought by the United States, with Argentina, Australia, China, Egypt, the EU, Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand as Third Parties, challenged various aspects of Turkey’s import restrictions on rice. Turkey seems to have adopted a policy of denying Certificates of Control to over-quota rice imports at MFN rates (at least to those originating in the United States). This policy resulted in the practice of effectively channeling all rice imports through in-quota TRQ imports. The United States challenged Turkey’s denial, or failure to grant, out-of-quota import licenses, as well as the domestic purchase requirement for inquota imports of rice, as inconsistent with Articles III :4 and XI :1 of GATT 1994 ; Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) ; Article 2.1 and paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMs Agreement; and Articles 3.5(e) and 3.5(f) of the Import Licensing Agreement..
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