Abstract

In 2006, Norway launched a stand-alone process to negotiate a ban on cluster munitions. The United Kingdom (UK) reluctantly joined the process to keep it within acceptable bounds. The UK acted as a spoiler in the negotiations. Yet, in the end, it agreed to ban all cluster munitions and became a champion of the new treaty. Why? I argue that two factors constrained and enticed the UK to go along with the process. First, small states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) structured the negotiations to disadvantage potential opponents. Second, NGOs also used shaming and praising to define the “desirable” UK policy. Not only did the UK accept a comprehensive ban, but it also started championing it as a result of two mechanisms—“cooperative bargaining” at the end of negotiations that led to a fair compromise and “mobilization of pride” by NGOs praising it for supporting the new norm. Whereas usually the success of weak actors in international negotiations is attributed to the persuasive power of their arguments, I show that strategic action by small states and NGOs may prove crucial in engineering the conditions both for their success and the rhetorical entrapment of stronger actors, such as the UK.

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