Rhetoric Is a Counterpart of Dialectic (E retorike estin antistrophos te "dialektike"

Abstract

Greek philosophers who preceded Aristotle, especially Gorgias, Plato, and Isocrates, developed their respective views on persuasive discourse (or rhetoric) based upon their larger philosophical projects. Similarly, I will argue in this essay, Aristotle developed his understanding of rhetoric as a part of his larger philosophical project. He not only equates rhetoric, in many respects, dialectic, but also treats it separately in the Rhetoric, perhaps as thoroughly as he treats dialectic in the Topics, In addition these two works, Aristotle addresses rhetorical issues in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutation, the Politics, and the Nichomachean Ethics, perhaps in a similar manner as he addresses dialectic in the Prior Analytics (24a22-25, 68b8-14, 46a3-10), the Sophistical Refutation (165bl-4), the Posterior Analytics (81bl8-23), and the Metaphysics (995b21-25). Moreover, the parts that comprise both rhetoric and dialectic syllogism/enthymeme; induction/example; the respective audiences; and the purposes: inquire, argue, persuade all receive considerable discussion throughout his logical and nonlogical works. The similarities of the ways in which Aristotle discusses both rhetoric and dialectic and his repeated claims that rhetoric is a counterpart to or outgrowth of dialectic suggest that, for Aristotle, rhetoric is very closely related dialectic, that his understanding that rhetoric may be just as much a part of his larger project as is his dialectic understood within the purposes and intended audiences of each and further suggest that in order understand his view of rhetoric, it is first necessary understand his view of dialectic.1