Abstract
This article challenges both those historians—represented primarily by neo-colonialists and World Systems theorists— who stress economic factors as motivations of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia during the 1950s. Although such analyses provide valuable insights into American foreign policy, neither the desire to secure the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia for American industry nor the perceived need to preserve a capitalist World System offers an adequate explanation for the American commitment to Southeast Asia. Using the business press and trade journals as primary sources, this article examines the public remarks and activities of the American business community throughout the decade; it concludes that, despite their frequently strong rhetoric, business leaders were generally ambivalent about the proper course of action in Southeast Asia and about the region's importance to American interests. The research presented here suggests that other, non-economic, factors may better explain U.S. policy in that region during the 1950s.
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