Rhetoric and Philosophy

Abstract

The problem of rhetoric as the speech that acts on the emotions can be treated from two points of view. It can be considered simply as a doctrine of a type of speech that the traditional rhetoricians, the politicians, and the preachers need, i.e., only as an art, as a technique of persuading. In this case the problems of rhetoric will be limited to questions of practical directions for persuading people and will not hâve a theoretical character. From another point of view, however, the problems of rhetoric can be seen as involving a relation to philosophy, to theoretical speech. We can formulate this in the following way: if philosophy aims at being a theoretical mode of thought and speech, can it hâve a rhetorical character and be expressed in rhetorical forms? The answer seems obvious: theoretical thinking, as a rational process, excludes every rhetorical element because pathetic influences the influences of feeling disturb the clarity of rational thought. Locke and Kant, for example, express this view, and their Statements are characteristic of the rationalistic attitude toward rhetoric. Locke writes: I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such Ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that ail the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; ail the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so are perfect cheats.1 Kant writes: