Régulation de l'activité des délégataires de services de l'eau et de l'assainissement : Qu'avons-nous appris ? Peut-on faire mieux ?

Abstract

Despite heavy impetus on the part of lawmakers, current legislation governing the operations of delegated local public service companies acting in the sectors of water and wastewater does leave a rather wide margin for potential mishandling, from the vantage point of both the company and local elected officials. Attaining efficiency in these services at the practical level implies the contribution of other mechanisms towards regulating this sector in a systemic fashion (what Dominique Lorrain has qualified as « regulator-free regulation »), which still remains only partial in scope. We'll be highlighting the role played by the relationships between the price and quality of water and wastewater services; our attention will then turn to presenting the results of an analysis carried out among 400 services in operation. The ensuing discussion will lead to recognizing to what extent the quality issue represents an uncertainty. Among the regulatory innovations suggested by economic theory as well as those resulting from selected experiments conducted abroad in other sectors of activity, we seek to emphasize the potential attractiveness of the « sunshine regulation », along with the fact that the relationships analyzed could help implement such a mechanism within the sector of water and wastewater services, whether at the national scale or Europe-wide. Lastly, we forward the notion that a « sunk cost » type of compensation formula would render the monopoly status enjoyed by delegated public service companies « contestable » and that competition could provide a powerful incentive for enhancing efficiency.