RFTC

Abstract

Random execution time-based countermeasures against power analysis attacks have reduced resource overheads when compared to balancing power dissipation and masking countermeasures. The previous countermeasures on randomization use either a small number of clock frequencies or delays to randomize the execution. This paper presents a novel random frequency countermeasure (referred to as RFTC) using the dynamic reconfiguration ability of clock managers of Field-Programmable Gate Arrays -- FPGAs (such as Xilinx Mixed-Mode Clock Manager -- MMCM) which can change the frequency of operation at runtime. We show for the first time how Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher algorithm can be executed using randomly selected clock frequencies (amongst thousands of frequencies carefully chosen) generated within the FPGA to mitigate power analysis attack vulnerabilities. To test the effectiveness of the proposed clock randomization, Correlation Power analysis (CPA) attacks are performed on the collected power traces. Preprocessing methods, such as Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), based power analysis attacks are performed on the collected traces to test the effective removal of random execution. Compared to the state of the art, where there were 83 distinct finishing times for each encryption, the method described in this paper can have more than 60,000 distinct finishing times for each encryption, making it resistant against power analysis attacks when preprocessed and demonstrated to be secure up to four million traces.