Abstract

In this article, we evaluate the virtues of an employment protection reform which is based on a simplification of the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and on the introduction of a U.S.-style experience-rating system. To this end, we use a search and matching model a la Mortensen and Pissarides to show that such a reform improves both the design of employment protection and the performance of the labor market.

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