Abstract

RFID ownership transfer protocols (OTPs) transfer tag ownership rights. Recently, there has been considerable interest in such protocols; however, guaranteeing privacy for symmetric-key settings without trusted third parties (TTPs) is a challenge still unresolved. In this paper, we address this issue and show that it can be solved by using channels with positive secrecy capacity. We implement these channels with noisy tags and provide practical values, thus proving that perfect secrecy is theoretically possible. We then define a communication model that captures spatiotemporal events and describe a first example of symmetric-key based OTP that: (i) is formally secure in the proposed communication model and (ii) achieves privacy with a noisy tag wiretap channel without TTPs.

Highlights

  • Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a widely-deployed technology for supply-chain and inventory management, retail operations and more generally automatic identification

  • Three different entities are present in an Ownership transfer protocols (OTPs): the tag T whose rights are being transferred, the current owner who has the initial control of T and the new owner who will take control of T when the protocol is completed

  • Formal definitions for secure ownership and ownership transfer are provided by van Deursen et al [1], while several theoretical models have been proposed in the literature that address the privacy of RFID systems [2,3,4,5]

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Summary

Introduction

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a widely-deployed technology for supply-chain and inventory management, retail operations and more generally automatic identification. Three different entities are present in an OTP: the tag T whose rights are being transferred, the current owner who has the initial control of T and the new owner who will take control of T when the protocol is completed. OTPs must incorporate security requirements that protect the privacy of both the new and the previous owner of the tag. Present an OTP that is provably secure in this communication model and that uses a wiretap channel with noisy tags to achieve privacy (Section 5). This is the first example of symmetric-key-based. GNYlogic and strand spaces [12,13,14,15] are used in the Appendix A for the security analysis

Definition and Security Requirements
Related Work
Entity Capabilities
Communication Model
Connectivity
A Wiretap Channel with Positive Secrecy Capacity
An Ownership Transfer Protocol
Analysis
Conclusions
Full Text
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