Abstract
AbstractWhy states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology and illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the rationale, potential, and limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist and psychological approaches. Both approaches provide ample justifications for making greater use of rewarding in international law.
Highlights
Within a state, compliance with legal rules can be secured through the courts and the police power
Lacking an “international sheriff” to force states to obey international law, the international system relies on the traditional concept of self-help and countermeasures
Rewarding is an important mechanism for compliance with international law
Summary
Compliance with legal rules can be secured through the courts and the police power. Lacking an “international sheriff” to force states to obey international law, the international system relies on the traditional concept of self-help and countermeasures The weakness of this decentralized system persists despite the proliferation of international courts and tribunals as well as the legally binding resolutions of the UN Security Council. Holding states to legal obligations poses conceptual as well as practical problems, making the questions of enforcement and compliance central to the study of international law.[2] Compliance theory provides an understanding of why states fulfill their international obligations, focusing on the design and operation of possible enforcement mechanisms.[3] International legal and IR scholarship have predominantly focused on negative incentives to comply.[4] the costliness of penalties and their ineffectiveness have been thoroughly discussed, they remain at the forefront of academic and policy discussions. We denote in the text if we refer to a specific meaning; otherwise we use compliance as an overall term
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