Abstract

While it is known that reward induces attentional prioritization, it is not clear what effect reward-learning has when associated with stimuli that are not fully perceived. The masked priming paradigm has been extensively used to investigate the indirect impact of brief stimuli on response behavior. Interestingly, the effect of masked primes is observed even when participants choose their responses freely. While classical theories assume this process to be automatic, recent studies have provided evidence for attentional modulations of masked priming effects. Most such studies have manipulated bottom-up or top-down modes of attentional selection, but the role of “newer” forms of attentional control such as reward-learning and selection history remains unclear. In two experiments, with number and arrow primes, we examined whether reward-mediated attentional selection modulates masked priming when responses are chosen freely. In both experiments, we observed that primes associated with high-reward lead to enhanced free-choice priming compared to primes associated with no-reward. The effect was seen on both proportion of choices and response times, and was more evident in the faster responses. In the slower responses, the effect was diminished. Our study adds to the growing literature showing the susceptibility of masked priming to factors related to attention and executive control.

Highlights

  • Masked primes influence behavior on a range of simple tasks (Marcel, 1983, but see Greenwald et al, 1996; Dehaene et al, 1998, 2006; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Newell and Shanks, 2014)

  • The masked primes lead to higher proportion of congruent choices and faster response times on congruent trials

  • The analysis of the forced-choice trials of the reward session showed faster responses for visible targets associated with high-reward compared to no-reward confirming that participants learnt to associate reward with the numbers presented on the forced-choice trials

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Summary

Introduction

Masked primes influence behavior on a range of simple tasks (Marcel, 1983, but see Greenwald et al, 1996; Dehaene et al, 1998, 2006; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Newell and Shanks, 2014). Traditional theories of cognition suggest that unconscious processes are prototypical examples of automatic processes which are not prone to interference from other processes (Posner and Snyder, 1975) This has been taken to imply that only conscious processes are susceptible to any form of strategic control and nearly-invisible stimuli are outside the domain of cognitive control. More recently, these views have changed and paved the way for more refined theories which allow for executive control over unconscious processing (Kiefer, 2012; Ansorge et al, 2014). While the role of attention in masked priming has been studied using traditionally defined forms

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