Abstract

Although some scholars argue that international norms have altered the motivations underlying state behavior, Russia’s intervention in Crimea suggests that states continue to pursue their national self-interest. While traditional realist assumptions explain a great deal of state behavior, they do not adequately incorporate important alternative tools of state intervention, such as economic and normative strategies. We propose a model that explains the rational decision making of great powers in contemporary international affairs. Informed by realist assumptions of state behavior, our model incorporates additional variables to explain unconventional strategies used by states to further their national interests. Realist conceptions of national interest continue to dominate national policy making, however, military force is often no longer the sole, or even the primary, tool used to accomplish those interests. In our model, this shift in tool usage is dependent upon the cost of each strategy to state actors. Based on the nature of the international system and a state’s power position in the system, a state will weigh the costs and benefits of an array of tools in order to pursue their security interests at the lowest possible cost. These insights may prove critical to responding to future international crises.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call