Revisiting the viability to allow dual-class share structure companies to list in the financial market of Hong Kong

Abstract

The request of Alibaba, China’s largest e-commerce company, to allow a self-selected group of its past and present management known as the ‘partners’ the right to nominate a majority of the directors in its negotiation with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) for an initial public offering (IPO) in 2013 reignited a new round of debate over the one share, one vote policy, which has survived for three decades in Hong Kong. Alibaba’s IPO application to list on the HKEx was eventually rejected which ultimately led to the company’s decision to list on the New York Stock Exchange. In late 2017, the debate on whether companies with dual-class share (DCS) structure should be allowed to list in Hong Kong re-emerged as the HKEx has announced that it would amend its listing rules to enable companies with DCS structure to list on its exchange, subject to certain safeguards and restrictions. This article examines what measures Hong Kong could adopt to allow companies with DCS structure to list on its exchange despite legal and institutional shortcomings of its financial market. In doing so, it will also make reference to other major financial markets in the world and examine how other jurisdictions have handled the issue of DCS structure companies.