Revisiting the United States Telecommunications Network Policy in a Post-Huawei World: Improving Economic Competitiveness, Addressing Security Weakness, and Building Alliances

Abstract

The evolution of the network gear manufacturing market into a small number of global providers has made network service providers (NSP’s) and countries increasingly reliant on a small number of supplier firms – a process exacerbated by the need to exclude recognized national security threats. The original intent of the O-RAN Alliance to increase interoperability, reduce excessive reliance on monopolistic providers and create a common pool of IP around interoperable standards is reasonable. In the first instance, the intent of the legislation focused on stimulating economic efficiency and addressing valid national security threats. The wording of that legislation, however, provides no explicit guidance, requirements, or standards linking national security threats to telecoms gear. Between a combination of conflicting incentives, lack of factual understanding on the issues, and poor oversight of legislative intent, the US promotion of open radio network interoperability as currently organized stands only to provide China the dominant position in standard setting and network manufacturing. Policy measures individually and in combination need to decouple the United States telecommunications network market from China; provide explicit legislative guidance and exclusions at the intersection of national security and telecommunications; build data and verification capacity on US supply chains that feed into telecommunications networks; and collaborate with allies to increase technology security and providing assurances to firms about the direction and reliability of US policy. These are individual measures that have received broad bipartisan support across the legislative and executive branches, over recent years.