Revisiting the Psychology of Structured Analytical Techniques

Abstract

Structured analytic techniques (SATs) are considered the gold standard for intelligence practitioners to mitigate judgmental biases. On the other hand, recent psychological research has challenged the effectiveness of SATs. Here, these seemingly irreconcilable standpoints will, to some extent, be reunited. To this end, the empirical evidence of three prominent SATs is reviewed: empirical research provides support for brainstorming and devil’s advocacy. The analysis of competing hypotheses, however, does not have empirical support. Based on the literature review and conceptual criticism of SATs, implications are discussed: the Intelligence Community (IC) must discard its antiempiricism. To this end, intelligence studies programs should regularly incorporate quantitative research methods courses in their curricula. The research community, on the other hand, should seek more frequent collaboration with the IC, to support the IC in improving the empirical foundations of their work. This could improve judgmental processes in intelligence analysis as well—possibly both within and beyond SATs. Moreover, other tasks in the IC (e.g., human intelligence) would benefit from a sound empirical approach as well.