Abstract
The accident with the P-36 oil rig in the Campos Basin in Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil, was one of the petroleum industry's worst international disasters. Based on this specific case, the article aims to (a) verify the role of the human dimension in the reliability of highly complex systems, with a focus on the management of incidental and accidental situations with the potential to lead to large-scale accidents. The analysis should help (b) shed light on some of the organizational factors that can increase the risk level in offshore activities, beyond the so-called immediate causes. The methodology involves mainly document research (especially the reports produced by Petrobras, ANP/DPC, and CREA-RJ) and interviews with three professionals that worked on the P-36 rig. The results indicate that the management of incidental and accidental situations in which emergency decisions are made should take advantage of contribution by the workforce, who can identify gaps in the process and discuss them with managers. This involves shared and more flexible decisions and collective analysis of risk situations. The findings also suggest that certain organizational factors contributed to the accident, corroborating domestic and international studies of major accidents and pointing to the need for a shift in the focus adopted by oil companies' management.
Highlights
The accident with the P-36 offshore oil rig on March 15, 2001, was one of the petroleum industry’s worst international disasters 1, resulting in 11 deaths and total loss of the rig, whose maximum production capacity was projected at 180,000 barrels per day, with an estimated financial loss of BRL 1 billion
Still, based on the analysis of the management of incidental and accidental situations, we believe it is important to examine the extent to which one can identify some of the organizational factors at the origin of actions and decisions that contributed to the accident, which the report by the Petrobras Internal Inquiry Commission 13 only mentions as “recommendations” and “areas for improvement”
The oily water in the emergency drain tank (EDT) was supposed to be pumped to the rig’s production header, which receives the flow of oil and natural gas from the production wells
Summary
The accident with the P-36 offshore oil rig on March 15, 2001, was one of the petroleum industry’s worst international disasters 1, resulting in 11 deaths and total loss of the rig, whose maximum production capacity was projected at 180,000 barrels per day, with an estimated financial loss of BRL 1 billion (more than USD 400 million at the 2001 exchange rate). This analysis highlights the need (b) to elucidate the organizational factors that can increase the risk level on offshore rigs, beyond the so-called immediate causes (human error and technical failures).
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