Abstract
ABSTRACTDeclassified documents from China and the former Soviet Union on the Malayan ‘Emergency’ reveal not only the Chinese Communist Party’s perspective of and role in the episode, but also that China’s unwillingness to help the Malayan communists was a factor that led the latter to opt for negotiations at Baling. Other contributing factors were the Malayan government’s willingness to negotiate, the Communists’ military difficulties, and the Communist International’s stance of peaceful coexistence. Baling’s failure marked the end of this phase of China’s rapprochement and a reversion to supporting armed struggle until relations thawed again in the early 1970s.
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