Revisiting Amodal Completion and Knowledge

Abstract

In a recent paper, Helton and Nanay (Analysis, 79(3), 415–423, 2019) present a new argument against two modal accounts of knowledge—safety and sensitivity. Their argument is based on the phenomenon of amodal completion (i.e. the phenomenon of representing occluded parts of a perceived object). According to them, amodal completion experience can ground knowledge; but in some instances, such knowledge is neither sensitive nor safe. Thus, they conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge. This paper pushes back. In particular, I defend the following three theses. First, Helton and Nanay’s argument for the claim that amodal completion itself can ground knowledge is unsound. Second, their objection against sensitivity is best construed as merely another instantiation of the old objection against sensitivity regarding inductive knowledge. Thus, sensitivity theorists have nothing to worry about over and above the old objection. Third, safety theorists can plausibly defend their account, insofar as they acknowledge that one’s ‘awareness’ of (close) error-possibilities can affect the epistemic status of one’s belief. My conclusion is that reflections on the phenomenon of amodal completion fail to generate any new objections against modal accounts of knowledge.