Review of empirical research on rotation and non-audit services: auditor independence in fact vs. appearance

Abstract

Confidence in the processes of corporate reporting and auditing has rapidly decreased recently due to front-page accounting scandals in both the United States and Europe. The goal of audit regulations, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States (US) and the 8th Directive in the European Union (EU), is to restore public trust in the auditing process. Along with other regulatory aspects, requirements related to audit partner rotation and bans on providing concurrent non-audit services were implemented to maintain auditor independence, both in fact and in appearance. However, the implementation of audit regulation implies that increased requirements are able to enhance the failed audit function. Empirical research should help to understand the impact of these two regulatory aspects and indicate their effectiveness in maintaining auditor independence. Thus, we outline the newest empirical research related to audit partner rotation and non-audit services and independence in fact or in appearance. Overall, we conclude that prior research does not point to one particular requirement that would most effectively restore trust in the audit function. Rather the existence of multiple threats to auditor independence might demand a combination of several requirements to maintain auditor independence. Thus, more research is needed to investigate the joint effects of different threats to auditor independence, e. g., non-audit fees and audit partner tenure.