Review of active defense methods against power CPS false data injection attacks from the multiple spatiotemporal perspective

Abstract

The power cyber–physical system (CPS) realizes the wide-area interconnection of new energy sources and multiple loads and the dynamic interaction of information and energy flows; however it faces increasingly severe security threats of false data injection attacks (FDIAs). In this context, the active defense methods against power CPS FDIAs from the multiple spatiotemporal perspective are summarized and analyzed in this paper. First, the architecture of a power CPS is abstracted and its multiple spatiotemporal coordination characteristic and FDIAs security risk are expounded upon. Then, the active defense system against FDIAs is conceived in the spatiotemporal coordinate system, and based on different spatiotemporal intersections, the six active defense methods and application examples – namely network deception, data encryption protection, vulnerability policy protection, false identification correction, traffic anomaly detection, and fault prevention control – are summarized. Finally, the limitations of existing active defense methods against FDIAs are discussed, and the linked defense methods with multiple spatiotemporal coordination are prospected.