Reverse-Payment Settlements Under EU and US Patent Law: Convergence in Remedies

Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates the existing case law on reverse-payment settlements from a comparative perspective, focusing on the US and EU panoramas. In this respect, we will illustrate the emergence of patent-related proxies in the anticompetitive assessment, which contaminate the antitrust benchmarks in a problematic way, with the effect of hampering patent law and policy. Primarily we will delve into seminal decisions in the EU framework. In this regard we will observe how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) shifted from a quick-look approach towards a case-by-case antitrust analysis of patent settlements, progressively neglecting, but not eliminating, patent-related presumptions. Then we will look at the fragmented US case law scenario. We will explore the various benchmarks deployed to challenge these agreements, highlighting the differences and similarities with the EU approaches. It will be concluded that a strong IP-law-based perspective about these agreements has arisen in both legal systems. This perspective orientates the anticompetitive assessment through quasi-absolute presumptions, hindering the consistency of competition law remedies and misrecognising the cruciality of patent law and policy. Therefore, we will try to outline that the intermingling of criteria adopted to scrutinise reverse-payment settlements and similar over-exclusionary strategies is pernicious under both antitrust and patent law.