Abstract

Revenue sharing is a common league policy in professional sports leagues. Several motivations for revenue sharing have been explored in the literature, including supporting small market teams, affecting league parity, suppressing player salaries, and improving team profitability. We investigate a different motivation. Risk-averse team owners, through their commissioner, are able to increase their utility by using revenue sharing to affect higher order moments of the revenue distribution. In particular, it may reduce the variance and kurtosis, as well as affecting the skewness of the league distribution of team local revenues. We first determine the extent to which revenue sharing affects these moments in theory, then we quantify the effects on utility for Major League Baseball over the period 2002–2013. Our results suggest that revenue sharing produced significant utility gains at little cost, which enhanced the positive effects noted by other studies.

Highlights

  • Many papers in the sports economics literature have studied the effects of different types of revenue sharing systems on league outcomes

  • Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the effects of revenue sharing on financial stability more directly by considering its effects on the league distribution of local revenues, and the potential benefits that they generate for team owners

  • Our results using data for Major League Baseball (MLB) suggest that the benefits to team owners can be significant, and that they provide a motivation for revenue sharing that we have not seen explored in the literature

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Many papers in the sports economics literature have studied the effects of different types of revenue sharing systems on league outcomes. In the simplest case of a sports league, a representative team owner faces an uncertain portion of team revenue (excluding fixed revenues that arise from the Major League Central Fund) from season to season, that takes on only two outcomes, high or low. These uncertain revenues arise from the inherent uncertainty of team performance due to injuries or changes in the performance of competing teams, or changing local market conditions. This behavior is consistent with U.S business data for approximately 5 million small firms whose owners invest a large amount of their own wealth in the business, and typically work at the business

A League
The Model
Risk Aversion
Skewness Reflects Prudence
Revenue Sharing and the Variance of Team Revenues
Revenue Sharing and the Skewness of League Revenues
Revenue Sharing and the Kurtosis of League Revenues
Overall Utility Gains from Revenue Sharing
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.