Abstract
I consider a worker’s optimal per-unit-time pricing problem on an on-demand service platform. I establish that if the customer arrival process is Poisson, then any price discrimination must result only from differences in the customers’ willingness-to-pay distributions, and not from differences in their arrival or service-time characteristics. For multiple customer classes that differ in their willingness-to-pay distributions, I present a simple procedure to compute the optimal prices. Finally, I analyze price competition across workers in the presence of reputation effects.
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