Abstract
Chapter 8 is the first of two chapters on the phenomenon of revenge paradoxes, paradoxes which, roughly speaking, are constructed out of the very terms of a purported solution. The chapter begins by exploring the difficulties that revenge presents for Kripke’s theory of truth, in either of two versions: a version that admits truth value gaps, and a paracomplete version which rejects the law of excluded middle. The chapter goes on to critically examine Field’s paracomplete theory of truth and its treatment of revenge, arguing that Field’s theory is couched in terms that are artificial and too far removed from natural language. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of Priest’s dialetheist approach to the Liar paradox, according to which there are true contradictions. It is argued that Priest’s theory is itself subject to revenge paradoxes.
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