Revealing the Impact of Investment Benefits on Marketing Decision in Public Infrastructures Based on Game Theory: Case Study of Large-Scale Exhibition Infrastructures in China

Abstract

Investing in large-scale public infrastructures is vital for urban renewal and development, often relying on specific types of buildings to drive investment in municipal infrastructure and supporting service buildings. However, the complex interplay of interests among investors introduces unpredictability, hindering the effectiveness of such investments. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore how investment benefits influence investor behavior. Using China’s large-scale exhibition infrastructures as a case study, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed, involving the government, investors in exhibition buildings, and investors in supporting services. The strategies of the three parties are analyzed, and simulations explore the effects of different initial strategy values, costs, subsidies, and profits. Five research outcomes are identified, indicating that favorable initial investments and optimal subsidies encourage proactive investment, while high initial costs deter it. Consequently, five recommendations for promoting coordinated investment in exhibition facilities are proposed, including the establishment of communication platforms to enhance stakeholder cooperation. These findings offer insights for decision making in other large-scale infrastructure investments, such as sports facilities and transportation hubs.