Revealing or concealing: The impact of environmental penalty spillover effects on corporate environmental information disclosure

Abstract

Abstract As a way of environmental protection, environmental administrative punishment affects the environmental decision-making of enterprises to a certain extent. This paper proposes the industry spillover effect of environmental administrative punishment, utilizes the variable factors affecting the quality of corporate environmental information disclosure, and puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between the spillover effect of environmental punishment and the level and quality of environmental information disclosure, whether it is “displaying” or “disguising”. Companies listed in the heavy pollution industry are selected as research objects to test the relevance of each influencing factor on environmental information disclosure. The double-difference method is used to construct the regression model to verify the influence of government regulation on the level of environmental information disclosure, analyze the impact of environmental information disclosure level on the market value of enterprises, and the relationship between environmental administrative penalties and environmental information disclosure. The regression equation passed the F-test with an adjusted R 2 of 0.425 and the coefficient of EDI of 0.362. It passed the 1% significance level test, indicating that the level of environmental information disclosure is positively related to enterprise value. The higher the level of disclosure of the environment, the higher the market value. Whether the listed company is engaged in legitimacy management or impression management, manipulating environmental disclosure during this period has an impact on the level and quality of environmental disclosure.