Abstract

Retributivists claim that the point of legal punishment, and the standard that ought to govern the construction of penal institutions, practices and rules, is that the guilty must be treated in the way that they morally deserve to be I construct an argument from elimination designed to show that there is no plausible index for measuring moral desert, and thus that a central plank of the retributivist platform is indefensible. I conclude by showing how deeply held intuitions that appear to support retributivism might be retained without embracing retributivism.

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