Retributive theories of punishment

Abstract

One of the most serious problems facing the analysis of philosophical arguments is the fat that some of the main terms in those arguments are ambiguous and vague. This is exactly the case with the term ?retribution?. Namely, in the philosophical literature about moral justification of punishment many quite dissimilar theories are often characterized as retributive theories of punishment. Also, the term ?retribution? is typically used in a very broad and imprecise way. What exactly is the meaning of the term ?retribution?? Is it the case that all the theories that are classified as retributive can be properly characterized in that way? These are the main questions that John Cottingham attempts to answer in his analysis of retributive theories of punishment. The main goal of this paper is to present Cottingham?s classification of retributive theories, as well as to explain its significance and potential defects. I hope that in the course of this paper it will become clear that, despite some minor flaws and shortcomings, Cottingham?s classification is still one the most thorough analysis of retributive theories of punishment, and that it is the best introduction to retributivism for anyone who is interested in the philosophy of punishment.