Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine

Abstract

This article examines the US Army's approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine from the Vietnam War to the present. COIN doctrine was largely neglected in the mainstream army after the Vietnam War and the success of high-tech warfare against Iraq in 1991 reinforced the cultural tendency of the US Army to ignore the lower end of the conflict scale. Since 2001, the army has had to relearn the basics of COIN; however, many aspects of insurgency have changed since Vietnam. Modern insurgents are organized quite differently to the Maoist insurgents of the 1960s. In addition, contemporary insurgents tend to be adept at employing the media. This article reviews and critiques current US Army COIN doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the tactical level, the US Army has been highly effective at learning COIN techniques. At the operational and strategic levels, the new doctrine represents a considerable step forward, not least in its understanding of insurgent organization. However, its implementation requires changes in force structures and there are still some issues not fully covered, such as the use of contractors, inter-agency cooperation, the training of host nation police forces and the information campaign. While the new army doctrine has its strong points, it is still not right. There are flaws in its conceptual understanding of insurgent organization, and in assessing the requirements for training and equipping allies in the developing world.