Rethinking the Davidsonian synthesis

Abstract

Davidson’s theory of mind and action involved a synthesis of ideas from Anscombe, Quine, and expected utility theory. Reflection on institutional agents and, in that light, on individual agents supports three adjustments to this synthesis: a more complex relation between intentional agency and densely holistic subjecthood; a more complex relation between rationally guided intentional action and action for a reason; and a basic role of guidance by prior, partial plans in part by way of providing a rationally sensitive background framework for weighing of reasons. The Anscombe-Davidson tradition saw the explanatory role of reasons and (in the case of Anscombe) the role of forms of self-knowledge, as the most fundamental features of our human agency. What needs to be added to this, as a further fundamental feature, are interrelated forms of mind-shaped practical organization—cross-temporal, small-scale social, and institutional. And human planning capacities support these forms of organization.