Rethinking the consequences of commercializing sport

Abstract

In the sport ethics literature, the general attitude with regard to the influence of commercialization in sport is to draw attention to the ways it undermines sport and morally corrupts those involved in it. This paper attempts to provide a counternarrative to this literature, focusing on criticism of commodification of sport that revolves around the idea of fairness. A brief libertarian framework is presented and three characteristics of sport (i.e. modularity, low entry, and exit costs) are outlined, which are shown to make sport a particularly well-suited context for libertarian approaches. Unlike a good deal of human activities, engaging and disengaging from sport carries few internal barriers, a fact that creates the opportunity for participants to introduce alternatives to the established way of playing sport. In this case, if alternatives to certain means of playing sport can always be found, then no concrete instance in which sport is played can truly be considered as unfair as individuals always have alternatives to escape a state of affairs they consider unjust. This general view is then used to address a series of arguments introduced by Walsh and Giulianotti to support the claim that commercialization engenders unfairness. More precisely, the degree to which sport can be considered a desert good or basic good is examined as well as the exploitative potential of contracts signed by professional athletes is investigated. Finally, the measures proposed by these two authors to restore fairness are considered, balancing the potential benefit these changes to sport can bring and the limitations to the freedom of athletes and investors in sport they generate. Ultimately, it is argued that since sport provides potential participants and audience options to enjoy sport outside of the currently existing instances of sport, strict interventions in the business of sport cannot be justified.