Rethinking Responsible Parties

Abstract

Some consider this to be a healthy trend, and conclude that because of the demise of the party factor in regression equations designed to explain voting decisions, citizens are becoming more politically rational. Others suggest that alternative entities, such as the media and organized interest groups, have taken up the slack created by a waning party structure. To such political scientists, the demise of party is not something about which to be particularly concerned. The point of view of this essay is that the party system is worth preserving and strengthening because it makes unique contributions to the political system. It provides an opportunity, nothing more than that, for the representation of broad interests, of interests which tend to be diffuse and disorganized, although not necessarily unimportant. With respect to this viewpoint, Mancur Olson's work1 is informative. Olson's analysis is discomforting to those who believe that all social interests may be represented by organized groups taking action on their own behalf. He recognizes that groups exist to further common interests, but also that individuals in groups have private interests. The interaction of these interests yields different results for small groups than it does for large groups, and this is a matter of considerable consequence for political action. The larger the group, the less likely it is to organize voluntarily and the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of the collective good. In short, action-taking groups are small and nonaction-taking groups are large. There is no tendency for large latent groups to become active, even if there exists perfect consensus.2 This dilemma is a function of the mixture of private and common interests in group life. It is not rational (in terms of a cost/benefits calculus) for individuals in large groups to make expenditures on behalf of the common interest. This is because the larger the group, (1) the smaller the proportion of the common good any individual acting on its behalf receives, (2) the more likely an individual will feel his actions are futile, and, following from these two conditions, (3) the greater the likelihood an individual will wait for others in the group to act on his behalf. When organization and