Abstract
Megaprojects to deliver public infrastructure are said to perform terribly, yet governments continue to initiate them. Though irrationality and biases may play some role, there may be other explanations for these decisions. By building on Hirschman's Hiding Hand and Flyvbjerg's concept of megaproject sublimes, and drawing upon institutional theory, this conceptual article advances the hypothesis that formal cost-benefit analysis is inherently bounded, and may fail to account for diffuse benefits that may support the commencement of public projects. Flyvbjerg's megaproject sublimes are used to construct a framework of such benefits, and proposed methods to test and substantiate them. This explanation challenges the orthodox view of megaproject performance, offers a solution to the megaproject paradox, and demonstrates the critical need for open data and open science practices in project research.
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