Rethinking Moral Motivation: How Neuroscience Supports an Alternative to Motivation Internalism

Abstract

AbstractIn this chapter, I draw on neuroscientific work to provide support for an alternative account of the relation between moral judgment and motivation. Much recent discussion focuses on the dispute between motivation internalists, who hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, and motivation externalists, who deny this. In contrast, I argue that this relation is best seen as a normative one: moral judgment ought to be accompanied by the appropriate motivation. I support this view by developing a descriptive account of moral psychology informed by research in neuroscience and psychopathology, which I call affective engine theory. According to affective engine theory, moral judgment is influenced by two distinct representational systems: affective mechanisms and general representational mechanisms. This descriptive account supports a disjunctive conception of moral judgment, which distinguishes between different kinds of moral judgments on the basis of the influence of different representational systems in their etiologies. I argue that such a conception of moral judgment is both descriptively and normatively adequate. Such considerations provide reasons to reject motivation internalism. However, rather than simply adopt externalism, I argue that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is governed by a normative ideal of moral agency. Such an ideal is required precisely because, as the empirically-informed account of moral psychology defended here makes clear, humans are prone to certain kinds of practical failures that result from a disconnect between distinct representational systems. Together, these arguments demonstrate how research in neuroscience can contribute to normative theorizing: attention to the neuroscientific details highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of moral thought and can therefore guide the construction of normative accounts that are descriptively adequate.KeywordsMoral motivationMoral judgmentInternalismExternalismAffectEmotionMoral agency