Rethinking Monitoring in Smallholder Carbon Payments for Ecosystem Service Schemes: Devolve Monitoring, Understand Accuracy and Identify Co-benefits

Geoff Wells,Janet A Fisher,Ina Porras,Sam Staddon,Casey Ryan

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.04.012

Abstract

Monitoring is a key aspect of payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes, providing a basis for payments. PES monitoring however presents challenges, including in balancing technical accuracy with cost, local equity and legitimacy. This is particularly true in smallholder carbon PES, where managers have limited resources and capacity. Here we explore ways to improve monitoring in smallholder projects. We looked at two well-established projects in Uganda and Mexico, and appraised five monitoring methodologies: two remote sensing and three field measurement approaches. Each methodology varied in data resolution, methodological complexity and degree of local participation. We collected quantitative and qualitative information on four aspects of performance: accuracy; costs; local equity; and local legitimacy. We show that methodologies with greater data resolution and local participation performed better in all four aspects, while greater methodological complexity was not associated with significantly improved performance. We conclude that monitoring in smallholder and other types of PES may be improved through: 1) devolving analyses to the local level; 2) communicating to stakeholders a distinction between ‘applied’ and ‘scientific’ accuracy; and 3) documenting and communicating the diverse functions of monitoring, referred to here as co-benefits – a contrast to simple ‘monitor and pay’ conceptions of PES.

Highlights

Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes are increasingly advocated (Milder et al, 2010), questions remain about their conceptual validity (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013) and technical feasibility (Guerry et al, 2015; Naeem et al, 2015)
Following the testing of a set of methodologies which span the spectrum of those recommended for forest projects (IPCC, 2006), we elaborate three conclusions that may help to optimise monitoring in PES schemes generally: 1) devolving plotlevel field measurement and analysis functions to the local level can provide a ‘quadruple win’ by improving all aspects of monitoring performance; 2) the monitoring demands of stakeholders could be rationalised by communicating that simpler methodologies can have the same ‘applied accuracy’ as more complex methodologies, where estimates are conservative; and 3) documenting and communicating about the broader functions of PES, including monitoring, may support more effective project design and may show that co-benefits are better rewarded by the market
Our findings build on existing research on the importance of local actors in project monitoring and administration (Brofeldt et al, 2014; Calvet-Mir et al, 2015) by suggesting that, in our cases, accuracy, costs, local equity and legitimacy may all be supported through devolving, data collection, and data analysis, to the local level

Summary

Introduction

Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes are increasingly advocated (Milder et al, 2010), questions remain about their conceptual validity (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013) and technical feasibility (Guerry et al, 2015; Naeem et al, 2015). PES are conceptualised as payments to providers of ecosystem services, conditional on delivery of an ecosystem service, often resulting from maintaining a particular land use (Engel et al, 2008). Monitoring ensures conditionality, with providers only paid when they satisfy contractual land use conditions (Corbera et al, 2007; Sommerville et al, 2009; Fisher, 2013). Through this paper we contribute to a more nuanced appreciation of these terms and consider options through which they may be promoted

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Conclusion