Abstract
How did the U.S. Intelligence Community and policymakers fail to predict and prepare for China’s entrance into the Korean War and North Korea’s invasion? Diplomatic cables, personal accounts, and declassified national security documents reveal that warnings about possible intervention were undercut by contradicting analysis. Cognitive bias led to faulty assumptions and ambiguous conclusions. The negative effects of bias and politicization were mutually reinforcing, imperiling the efforts of actors who tried in vain to address them. Lessons gleaned from this history shed light on insights for persistent security challenges, such as the relationship between miscalculation and escalation and the difficulty of knowing one’s adversary, as well as America’s present strategic competition with China.
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