Abstract

In recent years, theories of social understanding have moved away from arguing that just one epistemic strategy, such as theory-based inference or simulation constitutes our ability of social understanding. Empirical observations speak against any monistic view and have given rise to pluralistic accounts arguing that humans rely on a large variety of epistemic strategies in social understanding. We agree with this promising pluralist approach, but highlight two open questions: what is the residual role of mindreading, i.e. the indirect attribution of mental states to others within this framework, and how do different strategies of social understanding relate to each other? In a first step, we aim to clarify the arguments that might be considered in evaluating the role that epistemic strategies play in a pluralistic framework. On this basis, we argue that mindreading constitutes a core epiststrategy in human social life that opens new central spheres of social understanding. In a second step, we provide an account of the relation between different epistemic strategies which integrates and demarks the important role of mindreading for social understanding.

Highlights

  • Humans are hyper-social beings who strongly rely on the ability to successfully interact with others

  • Even on the combined account, understanding others is still constrained to mindreading, i.e. the attribution of mental states, albeit carried out via two concrete strategies, and should be considered a unitary account for our purposes. Irrespective of their differences, traditional monistic theories share the view that only one main type of epistemic strategy is relevant for social understanding, namely those strategies of indirect mental state attribution that are based on cognitive processes which allow us to infer or simulate the beliefs, desires, attitudes, or emotions that underly another person’s behavior

  • We argue that mindreading is a core epistemic strategy within social understanding because various spheres of our social life are only accessible via mindreading

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Summary

Introduction

Humans are hyper-social beings who strongly rely on the ability to successfully interact with others. We will identity three criteria that are commonly given in the literature for thinking that mindreading may be a less important component of social understanding: frequency, centrality, and reliability On this basis, we will argue in favor of what might be labeled as balanced pluralism. We accept the pluralist view, but argue that (1) the empirical evidence available for considering mindreading as less frequently used is not conclusive, (2) mindreading plays an important role in everyday cases of social understanding which are central to our life and in this sense is on a par with other epistemic strategies, and (3) that it is not clear that mindreading is inherently less reliable than alternative strategies.

Theory‐Theory and Simulation Theory
Direct Perception and Rule Projection
Challenge of Pluralism
Mindreading as a Core Epistemic Strategy
Frequency Argument
Centrality Argument
Three Central Cases of Social Understanding
Down Syndrome
Reliability
The Role of Mindreading in Balanced Pluralism
Idealized Types of Social Understanding
The Dynamics of Social Understanding
Conclusion
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