Rethinking Institutional Theories of Political Moderation: The Case of Hindu Nationalism in India

Abstract

<p>In March 1998, following India's twelfth general election, a coalition of sixteen parties led by Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a majority of seats in Lok Sabha, lower house of parliament, and formed a national government in New Delhi. For many observers, it marked a crucial turning point in modem Indian pol itics. The BJP, as front party of sangh parivar a family of militant Hindu organi zations led by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Corps), escaped its erstwhile political isolation by convincing a number of smaller secular par ties to join its ranks. In exchange, BJP shelved most contentious aspects of its agenda. Chief among them was campaign, spearheaded by its sister organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, World Hindu Council), since mid 1980s, to build a temple for Hindu god Ram in town of Ayodhya in northern state of Uttar Pradesh. The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign had led to demolition of Babri mosque, which allegedly stood on birthplace of Ram, on December 6, 1992, unleashing worst communal riots in India since partition in 1947.1 The events in Ayodhya and their aftermath convinced most secular parties to renounce electoral alliances with BJP. The BJP agreed prior to 1998 election, however, to remove Ram temple issue from its official policy platform. It also set aside other controver sial proposals such as adoption of a union civil code, which would nullify spe cial judicial arrangements regarding personal family laws governing various minority groups, and abrogation of Article 370 of constitution, which gave disputed Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir special asymmetric rights in union. As a result of these gestures, many commentators portrayed the politics of social exclusion that BJP has carried forward to new extremes [as] self-limiting in domain of representative democracy.'2 In general terms, two versions of self-limiting thesis underwrote these confident expectations. The first, more general version was that BJP as a party would respect rule of law due to general exigencies of democratic electoral politics. Committing excessive violence towards minority groups would harm its prospects at polls.3 The second, more particular version claimed that it would have to moderate its policies due to the compulsions of coalition politics.4 The inability of any single party to capture a parliamentary majority on its own after 1989 forced larger parties, such as</p> <p> </p>