Abstract
The article is based on an observation that there are significant and non-arbitrary similarities between two, seemingly quite distant, theories that address the problem of linguistic categorization. One is the theory of open texture put forward by a prominent legal philosopher, Herbert L.A Hart. The other is the theory of prototypes, originated from psychological research by Eleanor Rosch and developed by cognitively-oriented linguists, most notably Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, and Ronald Langacker. Firstly, the origins of the open texture theory are presented, including the discussion of Friedrich Waismann's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas and their impact on Hart's theory. Secondly, Hart's theory of open texture is examined, based on several articles and his masterpiece: The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961). Thirdly, a brief introduction to the prototype theory is provided, focusing on its reception in Cognitive Linguistics. Fourthly, a comparison of both theories is presented, including a sketch of a broader philosophical and historical background, as well as a detailed analysis of similarities and dissimilarities between them. The comparison results in a conclusion that, on linguistic grounds, the open texture theory can be viewed as an anticipation of prototype theory. Finally, several reservations are made in order to avoid possible confusions and some obvious objections.
Highlights
Categorisation, understood as the ability "to group different entities together as instances of the same kind" [46: 9] is intrinsic to both law and language, and its study is vital for both juristic theory and linguistic theory
The notion of open texture made its way into legal theory through the work of Herbert L.A
What is common to them all?—Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.[...] And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. The result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" [50: 31–32]. Note that this characteristic is a direct consequence of the previous one: if there is no single set of joint features, there must be some other principle for identifying members of a category; and cognitive psychologist found this principle, "governing the formation of the prototype structure of semantic categories" [35: 574], in the notion of family resemblance
Summary
Categorisation, understood as the ability "to group different entities together as instances of the same kind" [46: 9] is intrinsic to both law and language, and its study is vital for both juristic theory and linguistic theory. Despite these shared interests, legal scholars have long ignored linguistics and have barely noticed the significant transformations witnessed by the discipline since the 1950s. This article is based on an observation that there are significant and non-arbitrary similarities between two, seemingly quite distant, theories that address the problem of categorisation. The aim of the study is to critically evaluate these similarities, as well as the potential dissimilarities, in light of a broader philosophical and historical background, in order to determine the mutual relation of both theories
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