Abstract

Although growth coalition theory is widely used to explain urban renewal in Western literature, it needs to be adjusted and adapted to suit China's complex and diverse urban village development processes, considering the different local political structures. By analyzing three village cases in Zhuhai, we found that growth coalition theory overemphasized the increasing alliance between political and business elites at the expense of other actors such as villagers and rural collectives. The Shanchang case indicated the close coalition between the developer and the villagers to appeal jointly for additional rights from the local government. The local government made concessions about acknowledging illegal property rights and increasing allowable floor space to facilitate the smooth implementation of demolition. By contrast, the Lixi and Fuxi case showed that the local government formed a coalition with the rural collective in the demolition and compensation stage and formed an alliance with the developer in the construction stage. The case indicated that the government pursued the long-term goal of improving urban livability and enhancing industrial development apart from advocating property-led growth. This paper disclosed the diversity and complexity of the growth coalition, which could enrich the existing framework.

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