Abstract

The prevailing view of criminal libel among communication law scholars in the United States is that there are very few prosecutions, that most of the prosecutions are about politics or public issues, and that none of the prosecutions are necessary because victims of defamation can sue for civil libel. The results of an empirical study of all Wisconsin criminal libel cases from 1991 through 2007, however, suggest that criminal libel is prosecuted far more often than realized, that most criminal libel prosecutions have nothing to do with political or public issues, and that the First Amendment is an effective shield on the rare occasions when a criminal libel prosecution is politically motivated. This article concludes that criminal libel can be a legitimate way for the law to deal with expressive deviance that harms the reputations of private figures in cases that have nothing to do with public issues.

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